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THE EFFICACY AND FAIRNESS OF CURRENT SANCTIONS
IN EFFECTING STRONGER PATENT RIGHTS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Nathan E. Stacy, Ph.D.!
I. INTRODUCTION
The world economy has changed in recent years, with manufacturing
jobs shifting to nations with lower salaries! While the United States has
been living with this trend for many years, recently more and more white-
collar jobs have also been moving to other markets This has been
accompanied by the largest trade deficit in history, leading to concerns that
the long-term economic stability of the United States may be at risk.' One
optimistic point throughout all of the negative news concerning the trade
t J.D., University of Tulsa College of Law, Tulsa, Oklahoma, Anticipated May 2006; B.S.
Chemistry, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, May 1982, Ph.D. Inorganic
Chemistry, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, May 1987. The author thanks his
parents, Carl and Virginia Stacy, for their support and encouragement, especially when he
decided to return to school to study law. The author especially thanks his wife Teresa Lynn
Patterson for her love, encouragement, support and most of all patience making it possible
to pursue a law degree. The author is also grateful to the staff of the Tulsa Journal of
Comparative & International Law for their support, suggestions, and editorial assistance
while preparing this comment, especially Erin Bender, Matt Wiebe, Amanda Hunt, Krista
Hodges-Eckhoff, Emily Maxwell, Tim Hansen, Jill Parker and Lori Kingston.
1. See generally L.A. Lorek, Levi Straus to Ship S.A. Jobs Overseas, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 26, 2003, at 1A (discussing the reasons for Levi Straus closing two
San Antonio sewing plants, including the lower costs of overseas labor); see also Ken
Moritsugu, Jobless Recovery Lasting Longer then Expected; Companies are Trying to Find
Ways to Produce More with Fewer Workers, THE BRADENTON HERALD, Aug. 10, 2003, at 4
(explaining that the so called "jobless recovery" is due to both the use of higher technology
in the production of goods and services, and the shifting of more types of jobs overseas).
2. Associated Press, IBM Jobs Moving Overseas, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Dec. 16,
2003, at E01 (reporting on the movement of 4,700 programming jobs to India).
3. See generally Bruce Arnold, Causes and Consequences of the Trade Deficit: An
Overview, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE MEMORANDUM, Mar. 2000 (noting that the
largest trading deficit is with China).
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deficit has been the export of intellectual property. This is the primary
motivation for strengthening intellectual property rights in the world, as a
loss of these rights will directly harm the economic interests of the United
States .
A. Importance of Strong Intellectual Property Protection
This comment will focus on the importance of strong patent rights in
protecting the economic strength of the United States. In addition, the
economic benefits and liabilities that countries obtain through the
protection of these intellectual property rights will be discussed. The
comment will examine this subject in the context of the three most
populous countries on the planet: China, India, and the United States!
The second section will give an overview of what comprises
"intellectual property," including patents, copyrights, and other forms of
intellectual property. In the third section, the current organizations for the
enforcement of intellectual property rights will be examined, including the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Trade
Organization (WTO). This section will focus on the purposes of these
organizations, a brief overview of the history of their formation including
the treaties that formed each, and the enforcement mechanisms inherent in
each organizational structure. The dissatisfaction of the developed
nations, especially the United States, with the lack of enforcement
mechanisms inherent in (or used by) the WIPO, will be discussed. The
resulting enforcement mechanisms included in the Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Services (TRIPS Agreement),
implemented under the auspices of the WTO, will be examined.
The fourth section will discuss the difficulties in the development of
patent rights in the least developed countries (LDCs) and developing
countries (DCs). The perception of unfairness in the balance of
intellectual property laws between the developed and the developing
nations will be discussed, looking at some of the arguments raised by the
LDCs and DCs against strong intellectual property protection, including
4. See generally J. Thomas McCarthy, Intellectual Property - America's Overlooked
Export, 20 U. DAYTON L. REV. 809 (1995).
5. Id. at 813; see also GRAEME B DINWOODIE, INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
PATENT LAW (2002). "[A]s the leading exporter of intellectual property in the world, the
United States is a strong advocate for treaty membership and implementation." Id. at 233.
6. See CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (listing the populations of these
countries as China: 1.287 Billion, India: 1.050 Billion, United States: 290 Million) (last
visited Sept. 14, 2004).
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the problem of "biopiracy." Historical examples showing the importance
of intellectual property rights in the development of industries in
developed countries will be presented.
In the fifth section, changes made at the national levels in each of the
countries in response to the treaties or enforcement actions will be
discussed. A case study from the WTO, focusing on a dispute resolution
between the United States and India, will be used to illustrate these
changes.
The sixth section will examine some examples of individual
enforcement actions in the courts of the three countries. The seventh and
final section will discuss whether the current mechanisms in the TRIPS
Agreement are effective at requiring changes to strengthen international
property laws. An argument will be made that the changes made as a result
of this implementation, while difficult for LDCs and DCs in the short term,
will lead to beneficial effects in the longer term.
II. OVERVIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
"Intellectual property" is the right to products generated by the
creativity of a person. The importance of intellectual property rights
(IPRs) to the well being of the United States has been accepted as
important since its formation, as stated in the Constitution, "[t]he
Congress shall have power... [t]o promote the progress of science and
useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." 8 This clause
recognizes two of the three most crucial types of intellectual property:
copyrights and patents. Along with these two rights, the third most
important type of intellectual property is the use of trademarks.9 In
addition to these important rights, a number of less important intellectual
property rights have developed over the years. These include trade
secrets, mask works, and industrial designs.10
7. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 813 (7th ed. 1999).
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 9, cl. 8.
9. See ALEXANDER POLTORAK & PAUL LERNER, ESSENTIALS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, ch. 1 (2002). The author discusses "The Big Three: Patents, Trademarks, and
Copyrights." Id. at 1.
10. See id. at ch. 2.
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A. Patent Rights
A patent gives "the right to prevent others from making, using,
selling, offering for sale... or importing"" the protected invention for a
period of years. 2 Three types of patents are defined in United States
patent law: design patents, plant patents, and utility patents. 3 A design
patent is granted for "any new, original and ornamental design for an
article of manufacture., 14 A plant patent is granted for any invented or
discovered plant that one is able to asexually reproduce, so long as the
plant is not found in an uncultivated environment." By far, the most
important type of patent is the utility patent. 6 A utility patent is granted to
anyone who "invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof."' 7
This comment will focus on the protections available for patent rights.
However, it is important to have a definition of the remaining types of
intellectual property for comparison to the rights granted by a patent. A
trademark is used to identify a source of goods and can be any word,
18symbol, or combination. A trademark can be registered at the state or
national level, 9 and trademarks can also be used without registration, so
long as it is identified as a trademark.2°
B. Copyrights
A copyright grants the owner exclusive rights to reproduction,
preparation of derivative works, distribution, public performance, and
11. Id. at 2.
12. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 2701 (8th ed. Aug. 2001, revised Feb. 2003) (discussing
patent term for utility and plant patents); see also id. at § 1502.01 (discussing patent term
for design patents).
13. POLTORAK & LERNER, supra note 9, at 2.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2003).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2003).
16. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, US. Patent Statistic,
Calendar Years 1963-2003, available at ftp://ftp.uspto.gov/pub/taf/us-stat.pdf (last visited
Oct. 14, 2004) (indicating that in 2001, 166,039 utility patents were granted, compared to
16,872 design patents and 584 plant patents).
17. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2003).
18. POLTORAK & LERNER, supra note 9, at 23.





transmission of the work." It lasts for at least seventy years.2 To obtain a
copyright, it is only necessary for the creator to appropriately mark the
copyright status on the work, 3 and under certain circumstances, deposit a
24
copy with the Library of Congress.
C. Less Important Forms of Intellectual Property Rights
Other forms of intellectual property include trade secrets, mask
works, and industrial designs. Trade secrets consist of information that is
not generally known, and may include technical information, formulations,
21business methods, and other information. In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto,
the Supreme Court confirmed that trade secrets are a protected property
right in which companies are given the right to use or disclose their trade
secrets at their own option."7 While numerous common law doctrines in
28the United States make theft of trade secrets a civil offense, prior to the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996 no federal criminal penalties existed for
theft of trade secrets from companies3t The act was specifically designed
to protect United States corporations' trade secrets from theft for the
benefit of foreign nationals.3'
21. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2003).
22. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305 (2003).
23. 17 U.S.C. §§ 401-406 (2003); see also POLTORAK & LERNER, supra note 9, at 31.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 407 (1988).
25. See POLTORAK & LERNER, supra note 9.
26. See ROGER M. MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS, vo1. 1 - 2, § 2.01, 1 (Matthew
Bender 2003); see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS
RELATIONS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (defining a trade secret as "any formula, pattern, device or
compilation of information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an
opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not know or use it")
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
27. 467 U.S. 986 (1984). "The economic value of that property right lies in the
competitive advantage over others that Monsanto enjoys by virtue of its exclusive access to
the data, and disclosure or use by others of the data would destroy that competitive edge."
Id. at 1012.
28. RESTATEMENT, supra note 26, at cmt. a. "The theory that has prevailed is that the
protection is afforded only by a general duty of good faith and that the liability rests upon
breach of this duty; that is, breach of contract, abuse of confidence or impropriety in the
method of ascertaining the secret." Id.
29. 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (1996).
30. See James M. Fischer, An Analysis of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 25 SETON
HALL LEIS. J. 239, 248-56 (2001).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 1831, supra note 29, at § 1831(a) (discussing that the law is aimed at
"[w]hoever, intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government,
foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent...").
2004]
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Intermediate between patent and copyright are mask works. Mask
works are the stencils used in the creation of semiconductor chips, and they
pose a number of unique problems in intellectual property protection. 32
As useful products they cannot be protected either under copyright or
design patent laws.33 They are often obsolete by the time a patent could beS 34 •35
issued3 and they often would fail the non-obviousness requirement for a
utility patent.3" To prevent the loss of this expertise to intellectual theft,
Congress specifically passed a law in 1984"7 to recognize these assets and• • - 38
allow for their registration.
The final type of intellectual property consists of industrial designs.
39
Industrial designs have many of the same problems as mask works. For
example, they may be unique, but generally, they cannot pass the non-
obviousness test, and they have a very short commercial lifespan. 40 The
solution to this problem was a registration process similar to that used for
the mask works. Typically, the design is registered with the copyright
41protection office.
III. ORGANIZATIONS ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
The purpose of the World Intellectual Property Organization is to
protect the rights of creators and owners of intellectual property around
42the world. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
32. See POLTORAK & LERNER, supra note 9, at 41.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 42.
35. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2003).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1831, supra note 29; see also POLTORAK & LERNER, supra note 9, at 41.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 901 (2003).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1831, supra note 29; see also POLTORAK & LERNER, supra note 9, at4l.
39. POLTORAK & LERNER, supra note 9, at 42.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 43.
42. WIPO, An Organization for the Future, at
http:/lwww.wipo.int/about-wipo/engib.htm#P232347 (last visited Sept. 25, 2004) ("The
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) is an international organization
dedicated to helping to ensure that the rights of creators and owners of intellectual
property are protected worldwide and that inventors and authors are, thus, recognized and
rewarded for their ingenuity.").
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Property in 1883 created WIPO," The Paris Convention went into effect
in 1884, and an International Bureau was set up by the fourteen Member
States to administer the treaty." Copyright protection was added to the
administrative duties of the International Bureau in 1893, when the
International Bureau for the administration of the Berne Convention for
the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works was combined with the
International Bureau administering the Paris Convention to become the
United International Bureau for the Protection of Intellectual Property
(BIRPI).45  In 1970, the adoption of the Convention Establishing the
World Property Organization made BIRPI into WIPO,46 and in 1974
WIPO became an agency of the United Nations.
47
1. The Treaty Foundation for the WIPO
The Paris Convention is the founding treaty of the WIPO and defines
industrial property as "patents, utility models, industrial designs,
trademarks, service marks, trade names, and indications of source or
appellations of origin."48 The patent protection afforded such property is
defined in the treaty as equal to the protection afforded the nationals of
the country in which the protection is sought.49 While specific remedies for
trademark infringement are clearly delineated in the Paris Convention,"
remedies for patent infringement are only defined as the rights afforded a
national in the country in which enforcement is sought.51 In fact, the Paris
Convention does not extend patent protection equal to that afforded
nationals. It has an article that can force compulsory licensing of the
invention in the country in which protection is sought for either failure to
use the invention, or failure to work the invention in that country. 2 These
points mean that lack of harmonization of patent laws can be used to lower
the protection an inventor in one country will have in another country.






48. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, June 2, 1934, art. 1(2), 53
Stat. 1748, 828 U.N.T.S. 108, 115 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
49. Id. at art. 2.
50. Id. at arts. 7bis-10bis.
51. See id.
52. Id. at art. 5.
2004]
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that it has freer access to the patents of another country that generates
greater numbers of patents.53
This problem is apparent to practitioners, and has led to numerous
efforts to force this harmonization, including clauses contained in the
treaty that formally organized WIPO." In the treaty, one of the purposes
of the WIPO was to harmonize national legislation on intellectual
property.55 Numerous arguments have been made for the necessity ofS • 56
harmonization, but opponents from both developed and developing
countries have tried to resist normalization. From the point of view of the
developed countries, especially the United States, the efforts at
harmonization are an attempt to weaken patent protections.-7 From the
point of view of the developing countries, normalization of patent laws will
lead to stronger patent protection. Since most of the patents are from the
United States, they fell that this is just another example of the United
States' attempts at hegemony over the rest of the world 8
2. Developed Nations' Dissatisfaction with WIPO
The dissatisfaction of developed countries with the enforcement
mechanisms available through WIPO, the weakness of the protections
afforded patents under the Paris Convention, and the lack of
harmonization in patent laws led to the inclusion of the Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in the General
Agreement on Trades and Tariffs (GATT). 59 The developing countries, on
53. Kate H. Murashige, Harmonization of Patent Laws, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 591, 595
(1994).
54. Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, Jul. 14, 1967,
21 U.S.T. 1749, T.I.A.S. No. 6932.
55. Id. at art. 4 (i).
56. See generally Edward G. Fiorito, The WIPO "Basic Proposal" for Harmonization of
Patent Laws Viewed from the U.S. Practitioners Point of View, 19 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.
ASS'N. Q. J. 24 (1991); see also Murashige, supra note 53.
57. Fiorito, supra note 56, at 32-33 (noting that the U.S. stood by itself in continuing to
demand that the best mode requirement be met).
58. VANDANA SHIVA, PROTECT OR PLUNDER? UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 11 (Zed Books Ltd., 2001) (arguing that patents are "instruments of
conquest").
59. NUNO PIRES DE CARVALHO, THE TRIPS REGIME of PATENT RIGHTS, 24-25 (2002). "It
is true that the Paris Convention had already a few provisions obliging Member States to
adopt border measures and effective legal remedies, but those are of a general nature and
ultimately depend on the existence of national law provisions." Id at 25; see also id. at 43-44
n.152 (pointing out that the failures of the developing countries to participate in earlier
WIPO negotiations that would have raised patent protections "were the factor[s] that
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the other hand, wished to keep all discussion and negotiation of
intellectual property in the WIPO. 60 GATT, which contains the TRIPS
Agreement and establishes the World Trade Organization (WTO), was
signed into law in the United States in 1994.61
B. World Trade Organization (WTO)
The WTO was established on January 1, 1995, by the Uruguay Round
62
of Negotiations of the GATT. The primary purpose of the WTO is to
"help trade flow as freely as possible - so long as there are no undesirable
side-effects. 63 Within this context, the organization provides a negotiating
forum for nations to sort out their trade disputes,64 and provides a neutral
procedure to settle these differences." The initial GATT treaty that led to
the WTO was first signed in 1948, leading to a de facto organization given
the same name as the treaty.66
The rest of this discussion will focus on Article 4 of the Uruguay
67Round of GATT, known as the TRIPS Agreement. In what seems like a
non-sequitur, the most fundamental goal of the TRIPS Agreement is not
68to enhance intellectual property rights. This is secondary to its true
purpose of promoting free trade by increasing the strength of intellectual
property rights." This is illustrated by two factors. First, protecting the
convinced the major trading partners that GATT, unlike WIPO, could provide a more
persuasive negotiating environment - hence the pursuance of intellectual property
negotiations in the GATT"); Monique L. Codray, GATT v. WIPO, 76 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 121 (1994).
60. DE CARVALHO, supra note 59, at 43.
61. Louis S. Sorell et al., Changes to U.S. Patent Law Under GATT: Summary and
Practice Recommendations, 426 PRACTISING L. INST. 95 (1995).
62. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, UNDERSTANDING THE WTO 2 (2003), available at
http://www.wto. org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif elunderstanding-e.pdf (last visited Sept. 14,
2004) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING THE WTO].
63. Id. at 10.
64. Id. at 11.
65. Id. at 12.
66. Id. at 10.
67. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187;
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994); Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit
Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
68. DE CARVALHO, supra note 59, at 31 ("The first paragraph of the Preamble identifies
the most fundamental goal of the TRIPS Agreement: to reduce distortions and
impediments to international trade.").
69. Id. at 35.
20041
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author's "moral rights" to their work, as mentioned in the Berne
Convention, ° "does not necessarily promote free trade," and is not
required by the TRIPS Agreement. 1 Second, the TRIPS Agreement only
mentions inventors once, and then only to specify that the inventor will
reveal the best mode of the invention. 2 Although the primary purpose of
the TRIPS Agreement is not to strengthen individual patent rights, the
protection of individual property rights is the secondary purpose of
TRIPS.73 In the preamble, the agreement states that patent rights are
individual rights. 4 The purpose of this is to emphasize that governments
are to pass the laws necessary in each of the Member States to allow
private citizens to pursue their own actions against infringers. 5
1. Treaty on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS)
The TRIPS Agreement consists of seventy-three articles in seven
parts, covering basic obligations, intellectual property rights, enforcement
of rights, acquisition of rights, dispute resolution, a transitional period until
full implementation, and the implementation of institutional arrangements
for overseeing the agreement.7 The TRIPS Agreement covers a number
of intellectual property rights in addition to patents, including copyrights,
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, integrated
circuits, and trade secrets.17 This discussion of the TRIPS Agreement will
focus on those articles that are most relevant to protecting, obtaining, and
enforcing patent rights in Member States of the WTO.
As defined in Part I, the first and foremost obligation of Member
States is to implement the agreement in national legislation. s  Since
Article 1 includes the Paris Convention and Berne Convention by
reference, these treaties are now included in a framework that has
70. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, art.
1lbis(2), 99 Stat. 27, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27.
71. DE CARVALHO, supra note 59, at 35.
72. Id. at 36.
73. Id. at 32.
74. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, at 84.
75. DE CARVALHO, supra note 59, at 33.
76. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, at 83.
77. Id.
78. Id. art. 1, cl. 1, at 84-85.
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enforcement power." As in the Paris and Berne Conventions, the TRIPS
Agreement requires Member States to treat nationals of other Member
States no less favorably than its own citizens." The agreement also
prevents nations from arranging side agreements to treat each others'
citizens more favorably than those of other Member States.8'
Part I also contains a clear statement of the objective of the TRIPS
agreement in Article 7:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of
producers and users of technological knowledge and in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and
82
obligations.
While the obligations are clearly defined, the agreement still leaves
the freedom for nations to adopt measures they feel are of national
importance, so long as they are consistent with the TRIPS Agreement."
One issue that could not be agreed upon in the Uruguay Round of
negotiations was the concept of exhaustion of patent rights. 4 Under many
circumstances, patented products may be sold at a lower price in one
country than another.8' This motivates importation of products from
countries with a lower price to countries with a higher price; this is defined
as parallel importation. In the absence of trade barriers, the only control
a producer has over this is the existence of patent rights in the country of
importation." Since patent rights are national rather than international,
the owner should be able to enforce the rights in the target country to
prevent importation; however, they are often blocked by the doctrine of
exhaustion of patent rights." The doctrine of exhaustion of patent rights
79. Id.art. 2, cl.2, at 85; see also DINWOODIE, supra note 5, at 233 (noting that "[als a
general matter, countries are expected or required to bring their laws into compliance with
treaty obligations before joining").
80. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, art. 3, at 85.
81. Id. art. 4, at 86.
82. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, art. 7, cl. 1, at 86-87.
83. See id.
84. Id. art. 6, at 86.
85. David Perkins et al., Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights, 574 PRACTISING L.
INST. 41, 45 (1999).




TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
originated in the United States and the United Kingdom in similar ways,
and basically states that once a product is sold under a patent, the buyer
has the right to use, sell, or dispose of the product in any way he or she
wishes, including exportation to any other country.s9 The importance of
this subject is highlighted by the current disputes over attempts to import
lower cost pharmaceuticals from Canada.90 The importance of the
exhaustion of patent rights and the inability of the negotiators to agree on
inclusion of the topic in TRIPS nearly guarantee it will become a point of
contention in future trade disputes.
One of the most important changes from previous conventions, made
a part of the TRIPS Agreement, focuses on defining what can be protected
as intellectual property.9' The requirements for a patent are defined in
section five of part 11.92 The TRIPS Agreement details the requirement as
follows: "patents shall be available for any inventions, whether products or
processes, in all fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve
an inventive step and are capable of industrial application."93  This
wording, including "inventive step," and "industrial application," follows
the wording of the European Patent Convention. 94  To ensure
standardization, the TRIPS Agreement explicitly equates these terms with
"non-obvious" and "useful, 95 matching the wording used in the United
States.96 In addition to these requirements, Member States are permitted
to exclude certain items from patentability, including items that may be
harmful to public health or morality, 7 medical and diagnostic procedures,9"
and animals or plants under most circumstances.
89. Id. at 48.
90. See generally Karl Ross, Bush Rebuffs Canada Drug Plan; Gov. Bush Rejects Miami-
Dade Mayor Alex Penelas' Attempts to Begin a State Program to Import Less-Expensive
Canadian Prescription Drugs, THE MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 25, 2003, at 1; Sarah Lueck, Senate
Supports Wider Importing of Canada Drugs, WALL ST. J., June 23, 2003, at A10.
91. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, pt. II, at 87-99.
92. Id. arts. 27-34, at 93-97.
93. Id. art. 27, cl. 1, at 93-94.
94. European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 52(1).
95. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, pt. II, at 87.
96. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2003) (requiring that an invention must be "new and useful" for
patentability); see also 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2003) (requiring that an invention must be "non-
obvious" for patentability).
97. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, art. 27, cl. 2, at 94.
98. ld. art. 27, cl. 3(a), at 94.
99. Id. art. 27, cl. 3(b), at 94.
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2. Enforcement Mechanisms in the TRIPS Agreement
The major rights conferred on a patent holder under the TRIPS
Agreement are the ability to prevent others from practicing or importing
materials in violation of the terms of the patent and to license or sell the
patent to others.'O While these rights are analogous to the rights given
patent holders in the United States,"' the TRIPS Agreements contains a
number of conditions under which patent holders can be deprived of their
patent rights.'02 The first of these conditions is the limited use of the
patented product under Article 30, provided such a use does not
"unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner."'0 3
An example of this is the regulatory review exception permitted for
pharmaceuticals in Canada, which allows any amount to be produced to
prove the ability of the future manufacturer of a generic drug to meet
quality and technical specifications, so long as the product is not sold or
stockpiled for future sales. °4
A more problematic exception to patent holders' rights is provided in
Article 31,'°' which allows for compulsory licensing of patents under a
number of conditions.' 6 DCs and LDCs have strongly fought for the right
to force compulsory licenses, but they harm both patentees and the nations
in which they are granted. °7 The patentees' rights are harmed by giving up
the right to turn down a licensee, while the presence of compulsory
licenses as an option kills research in areas in which they are granted.
While they cannot be granted for trivial purposes, some LDCs will be
allowed to issue licenses across borders to enable generic firms in more
developed countries to make drugs for major health crises, such as the
AIDS pandemic in southern Africa." 9 The TRIPS Agreement does
require adequate compensation for the patent owner, a limited term for
100. Id. art. 28, at 94.
101. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2003).
102. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, arts. 30-31, at 95-97.
103. Id. art. 30, at 95.
104. DE CARVALHO, supra note 59, at 220 n. 567.
105. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, art. 31, at 95-96.
106. DE CARVALHO, supra note 59, at 230; see also id. at 60 (noting that a compulsory
license is a license granted by a government to a firm other than the patent owner to work
the patent locally, or to obtain a lower price for the goods).
107. Id. at 231.
108. Id.
109. WTO'S Compulsory License Rules, FOOD & DRUG LE'rER, No. 688 (Nov. 21, 2003).
2004]
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
the compulsory license, and non-exclusivity for the compulsory licensee, all
of which tend to discourage the use of compulsory licenses.1
In addition to the requirement that all subject matter be patentable,
the second most important change that the TRIPS Agreement provides
over previous patent conventions is the establishment of clear procedures
for the enforcement of intellectual property rights.' These articles do not
stop at the general requirement of the Paris Convention that "nationals of
each of the countries of the Union shall ... enjoy in all other countries of
the Union the advantages that their respective laws now grant.., to
nationals.',1 2 In the Paris Convention, the format of the legal proceedings
for the protection and enforcement of intellectual property was expressly
reserved to the Member States."3 In the TRIPS Agreement, however, the
format of the entire proceeding is clearly laid out, including fundamental
requirements that the procedures "be fair and equitable [and] ... shall not
be unnecessarily complicated or costly.""..4 Also, the decisions must be in
writing and provided to the parties "without undue delay.""..5 While the
TRIPS Agreement specifically states that it does not require the creation
of an extra-judicial system for intellectual property cases, nor the
allocation of scarce judicial resources to these types of cases,"' it does
impose a number of complex requirements. These requirements include
formalities concerning procedures, " ' evidence,"' and remedies." 9
The procedural requirements include much of what would be
considered due process in developed countries, including: timely and
complete written notice of the proceedings and their basis, the right to
present evidence to substantiate claims, and procedures to protect
confidential information. 2 0 The evidentiary requirements include required
disclosure of evidence by the opposing party upon the presentation of a
110. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, art. 31(d), (g), & (h), at 95.
111. Id. pt. III, at 99-105.
112. Paris Convention, supra note 48, art. 2(1).
113. Id.
114. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, art. 41, c. 2, at 99.
115. Id. art. 41, c. 3, at 99.
116. Id. art. 41, cl. 5, at 99-100.
117. Id. art. 42, at 100.
118, Id. art. 43, at 100.
119. Id. arts. 44-46, at 100-101.
120. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, art. 42, at 100.
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prima facie case, 12 and the ability of authorities to make a determination
in the absence of voluntary presentation of evidence.122
The relief mechanisms defined by TRIPS are analogous to those in
U.S. Civil Procedure. These include injunctive relief, which may be
granted at the discretion of the Member State.124 Additionally, damages
may be ordered by the Member State's court, including adequate
compensation for the infringement, and potentially including appropriate
attorney's fees and disgorgement of profits.'2 The TRIPS Agreement also
includes an article that allows judicial authorities to seize and dispose of
property made in violation of another's intellectual property rights.
121
The requirements above detail the general options that private
entities have in enforcing their patent rights in Member States, which are
required to be incorporated into national laws by the structure of the
WTO itself. If a Member State does not implement the provisions,
private entities are left without enforcement options because intellectual
property rights are defined as private rights by the agreement.11 The
TRIPS Agreement should be seen as a starting point for the protection of
intellectual property rights, but "sets only minimum standards that remain
far below those embodied in U.S. intellectual property law." '29
IV. DIFFICULTIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PATENT RIGHTS IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Despite the improvements the TRIPS Agreement brings to the
development of patent rights, enforcement in many developing countries is
very difficult.1 3' There are many reasons for these difficulties; the four
primary reasons will be discussed here: the cultural differences between
the developed and developing nations, the lack of judicial and legislative
structures in LDCs and DCs, the focus on economic self interests by both
121. Id. art. 43, cl. 1, at 100.
122. Id. art. 43, cl. 2, at 100.
123. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 64-71 (covering provisional and final remedies).
124. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, art. 44, at 100.
125. Id. art. 45, at 101.
126. Id. art. 46, at 101.
127. Id. art. 1, cl. 1, at 84-85.
128. Id. Pmbl., at 84.
129. TERENCE P. Ross, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: DAMAGES AND REMEDIES § 12.02
[2] (2003).
130. See generally Ronald J.T. Corbett, Protecting and Enforcing Intellectual Property
Rights in Developing Countries, 35 INT'L LAW. 1083 (2001).
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the developed nations and the developing nations, and the perceived
unfairness of the intellectual property laws.
Intellectual property is a new concept in many of the developing
nations that have joined the WTO, and are obligated to implement the
TRIPS Agreement.' In Latin American nations, as in many developing
nations, intellectual property is not viewed as a private asset, but as either
"information with commercial value or the heritage of humanity."' 132 In
formally communist countries, such as the People's Republic of China
(PRC), the entire "concept of having individual rights in intangibles such
as intellectual property is a new one.' 33 In all fairness, even in developed
nations it is often difficult for the average citizen to grasp the importance
134
of the protection of intellectual property rights.
In addition to cultural differences, implementation of the TRIPS
Agreement has been difficult for the LDCs because they often lack many
of the bureaucratic and judicial structures necessary for implementation."'
Not only are the average citizens of LDCs unaware of intellectual property
rights and the vast array of complex structures that need to be
implemented, including patent offices, changes in laws, additional
enforcement, but many of the law enforcement officials, judges, and civil
servants are unaware as well.'36 For example, LDCs may be overwhelmed
131. See generally Ross, supra note 129.
132. Kimberly A. Czub, Argentina's Emerging Standard of Intellectual Property Protection:
A Case Study of the Underlying Conflicts Between Developing Countries, TRIPS Standards,
and the United States, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 191, 220 (2001).
133. Corbett, supra note 130, at 1085.
134. See Tobias Young, Petaluma Mat Upset over Paying $4,000 in Music Suit; Daughter's
Downloading Led to Being Targeted by Recording Industry, SANTA ROSA PRESS
DEMOCRAT Feb. 14, 2004, at Al (discussing the filing of suits by the recording industry for
illegitimate file sharing; in the article, the author makes the point that many of the persons
who downloaded the music, including the parents of children who downloaded music, did
not know that they were breaking the law); see also Andrew Sullivan, The Way We Live
Now: 6-11-00: Counter Culture; Dot-communist Manifesto. N. Y. TIMES, June 11, 2003, § 6,
at 30 (discussing the author's confession to downloading music from NAPSTER, then going
on to state that he felt no remorse, since both the record companies and the artists are "rich
enough already"); for a response see Andrea Wolper, Tech 2010, N. Y. TIMES, July 11, 2003,
§ 6, at 8 ("Andrew Sullivan doesn't give a thought to how musicians and writers are
supposed to survive as long as we don't actually live in a communist society.... Or perhaps
he is advocating only stealing from musicians who are already rich -- because people bought
their albums.").




by the cost and complexity. 37 Many of the LDCs and even DCs were far
from implementing their obligations by January 1, 2000, which may imply
that there could have been some overreaching on the part of negotiators
during the Uruguay Round.'38 However, the greatest difficulty has been
overcoming political opposition.'
Many DCs, it is felt that strengthening patent rights only transfers
wealth from the DCs to the developed countries, since the majority of
intellectual property rights currently reside in the developed nations.40
Developing nations often have large industries dedicated to pirating good.
Thus, enforcement of rights will clearly have a detrimental effect on these
industries and for the economy in the short term.41  For example,
Argentina has one of the worst records of intellectual property theft of
pharmaceuticals in the world, with around $500 million per year copied
from multinational corporations.' However, Argentineans point out that
adoption of stronger protection for intellectual property rights in Chile
resulted in the disappearance of the local pharmaceutical industry.
43
Politicians in these nations are not likely to want enforcement of
intellectual property rights, since "[r]igorously protecting intellectual
property rights may be viewed as favoring foreign interests over domestic
business interests and the welfare of citizens.', 4 4 For example, studies
show that the price of pirated pharmaceuticals are fifty six percent lower in
Argentina, than for the same product produced under the patent and sold
in the United States. 45
A. The Doha Declaration
It was in this context that the Doha Declaration was agreed upon.146
The Doha Declaration was intended to assist LDCs and DCs in economic
development and participation in international trade.'4 7 It was recognized
137. Id.
138. Id. at 61.
139. Id.
140. DINWOODIE, supra note 5, at 369.
141. Corbett, supra note 130, at 1085.
142. Czub, supra note 132, at 192.
143. Id. at 210.
144. Corbctt, supra note 130, at 1085.
145. Czub, supra note 132, at 201.
146. WTO, MINISTERIAL DECLARATION, Doha, Nov. 20, 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/I,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/ministe/min0l_c/mindeclc_.pdf (last
visited Sept. 14, 2004).
147. Id. cl. 2.
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in this agreement that implementing the obligations under the WTO
agreements was very difficult for LDCs and DCs, and that further
assistance would be required. 8  The Declaration had specific clauses
focusing on the TRIPS Agreement, and its effects on LDCs and DCs.1
49
These specifically focused on the need for both access to medicines in
LDCs and DCs, research into new medicines,' and the issues specific to
the concern of LDCs and DCs with respect to biopiracy."' The Doha
Declaration expressed a number of concessions made by the developed
countries to thq LDCs and DCs, including lowering the requirements for
compulsory licensing of patents in order to allow local pharmaceutical
manufacturers to make lower cost versions for an indigenous population."'
While the Doha Declaration has assisted in resolving, or at least clarifying,
a number of issues in TRIPS for LDCs and DCs, it has been criticized as
leaving a number of gaps. Examples of these gaps include: a
postponement of the discussion of options for LDCs that need lower cost
medicines but have no manufacturing infrastructure of their own 154 "what
constitutes a national emergency" under which production of drugs by
compulsory licenses is allowed,' 5 ' and the lack of a binding precedent, since
the document does not carry any weight in the dispute resolution156
process. The declaration, while not completely solving problems in
TRIPS, was a significant step forward in relations between developed
countries and the LDCs and DCs As the author noted, "[t]he
international intellectual property system can only be successful if it
creates benefits for all."' 58
Perhaps the most important point for citizens of developed countries
to keep in mind is the total magnitude of the losses from the theft of
intellectual property in LDCs and DCs and the direct risks to health and
safety as a result of stolen intellectual property. In 1998, losses due to the
theft of copyrighted material were around $10 billion, with twenty five
148. Id. cl. 3.
149. Id. cls. 17-19.
150. Id. cl. 17.
151. Id. cl. 19.
152. Nabila Ansari, International Patent Rights in a Post-Doha World, 11 CURRENTS: INT'L
TRADE L.J. 57, 63 (2002).
153. See generally id. at 57-68.
154. Id. at 64.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 67.
158. Ansari, supra note 152, at 67.
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percent occurring in the People's Republic of China (PRC).' 9
Additionally, losses from software piracy were estimated at $11 billion in
1998. 16 In many countries, purchased copies of software are the exception
rather then the rule. For example, in Russia, Vietnam, Indonesia and the
PRC, over ninety percent of all business application software is pirated. 1
Theft of intellectual property may also cause significant risks to health and
safety. As one report stated:
[C]ounterfeit items are so prevalent it is difficult to purchase legitimate,
non-bootlegged, goods for products such as CDs and DVDs in Chinese
markets. Recently, Cohen said, Chinese exporters have begun
producing counterfeit aircraft parts, counterfeit car parts, and indeed
whole counterfeit cars and motorcycles. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals
have left several Americans hospitalized because of toxic reactions. 162
History shows that nations will resist stronger intellectual property
protection until it is in their best interests to do so, as shown by the actions
of Switzerland in the nineteenth century."' In 1866 and 1882, patent laws
were rejected by popular referenda,' 64 but public opinion changed as
increasing outside competition with the technologically advanced and the
watch industry developed.16 1 In 1887, Swiss voters approved a patent law
but limited it to mechanical devices because they found it advantageous to
continue to use chemical technology developed by the more advanced
Germans. 66 This continued until the German Reich threatened significant
trade sanctions unless German technology was protected. 67 Even then, the
Swiss patent laws were only changed to allow the patenting of chemical
process technology, leaving their ability to make compounds by different
processes intact.
159. Corbett, supra note 130, at 1084.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. U.S. Department of State, Rampant Counterfeiting in China is Costing U.S. Billions,
International Information Programs (Feb. 3, 2003) (on file with the author).
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B. Controversies on the Importance of Patent Rights
Perhaps one of the most critical trends for developed nations to watch
is an anti-globalization movement that apparently promotes patent rights
not being granted at all due to inherent unfairness." 9 The core of this
argument seems to be that since intellectual property rights are valuable,
they are inherently bad for the overall population and only good for a
small minority of intellectual property rights holders. 7 However, this
argument itself is subverted in the text by the author's recognition of two
points. First, "[i]ntellectual property rights already constitute an
increasingly large share of property in the advanced market economies,
especially the United States. Activities surrounding intellectual property
are fast becoming the core economic functions in advanced capitalist
economies." '171 When this is taken with the previously mentioned losses
from theft of intellectual property, the overall importance of protecting
intellectual property rights is further emphasized. 112 Second, although
subversive to his thesis, the author makes a general statement on the
relative importance of intellectual property as a factor in the global
redistribution of wealth:
I do not pretend that intellectual property is the only cause of the
increasingly unequal distribution of income around the world. During
the same decades that intellectual property rights have been
strengthened, in the United States the rights of unions have been
weakened; cheap imported goods have displaced millions of decently
paying working-class jobs; and the tax codes have radically tilted in
favor of the wealthy.
173
Since the theft of intellectual property rights often leads to the
171generation of lower cost imitation goods, this will be harmful to
employment, contributing to the job loss of which he complains.7 1
A more cogent argument is made against the unfair practice termed
"biopiracy."' 71 The term is used to describe the patenting of medicines
169. See generally MICHAEL PERELMAN, STEAL THIS IDEA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND THE CORPORATE CONFISCATION OF CREATIVITY (2002).
170. PERELMAN, supra note 169, at 5.
171. Id. at 3.
172. See infra pp. 20-21.
173. PERELMAN, supra note 169, at 7.
174. Paris Convention, supra note 48, art. 2; see also Perkins et al., supra note 85.
175. See generally Lorek, supra note 1.
176. SHIVA, supra note 58, at 49.
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found in indigenous cultures. 17   As the argument goes, a large western
based corporation, such as the United States, will send scientists into LDCs
or DCs to find indigenous knowledge that can be used in the development
of new drugs or foods; they take that knowledge back and patent it with no
regard for the ownership rights of the peoples from which it came. 78 At
that point, the company can either buy the entire supply of the material,
depriving the indigenous population of its benefit, or attempt to force the
native population to stop using the material in citing their use as a
violation of the company's newly developed rights to the material. 9
Normally, a patent cannot be granted for material that has been
previously discovered or published (prior art); however, the patent law of
the United States allows inventions from information commonly known in
other countries, but not in publications, to be patented."s  This
geographical limitation would seem to promote the constitutional purpose
of patents by promoting the introduction and use of technology known in
other parts of the world in the United States, but this was not the original
purpose of the patent laws in the United States. 8' Prior to the
introduction of the geographic limitation on prior art in 1836, evidence of




This is currently the case in Europe, where evidence of previous use in
some part of the world can be introduced as prior art, even if not in a
publication. 3 The difference in evolution between the two patent systems
must be noted. The European Patent Organization (EPO) is an
intergovernmental organization that was created in 1977, subsequent to
177. Id. at 4.
178. Id. at 49.
179. See id. at 57-61 (discussing the discovery and western patenting of insecticide products
from neem, a native plant of India, where the usage of the plant for these purposes is
widespread and well-known; in India, the sudden popularity of neem in the west has
resulted in a significant price increase, and a significant decrease in supply, seriously
impacting the availability of the plant for the indigenous population).
180. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)-(b) (2003).
181. See Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographical Limitation on Prior
Art in a Small World, 87 MINN. L. REV. 679, 684 (2003) ("From its earliest days, the
Intellectual Property Clause has been understood to prohibit the grant of patents (1) to
non-inventors and (2) for inventions in the public domain, even if the grant of a patent
might have expedited the introduction of beneficial technology within U.S. borders.").
182. Id. at 697; see also Shaw v. Cooper, 32 U.S. 292, 298 (1833) (stating that "there was
nothing in the act confining such use to the United States; and that, if the invention was
previously known in England or France, it was sufficient to avoid the patent, under that
act").
183. Bagley, supra note 181, at 686-87.
20041
TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
the signing of the European Patent Convention (EPC) in Munich in
1973.184 Since the EPC was intended to harmonize patent requirements in
Europe across numerous international boundaries, it can be inferred that it
is inconsistent with the goal to bar evidence of use in one country from
preventing patentability in another. The United States patent system, on
the other hand, has always been focused on a single nation.
An example of the differences is clearly shown in the fight over patent
rights in the use of Azadirachta indica (known as neem), a plant native to
India. Neem is a very common and important tree to the indigenous
population of India, where it is used in numerous applications, including
insecticides, cosmetics, and native medicines."' W.R. Grace acquired the
United States patent right to neem from its western "discoverer," Robert
Larson, and pursued patent protection in Europe, with the United States
government as a co-inventor."' In Europe, a consortium called the "Neem
Team," consisting of two non-governmental organizations from India and
the Health and Environment Minister of Belgium, challenged the
European patent in front of the EPO, claiming the patent was not valid on
the basis of prior art.ln The EPO agreed with this argument, and on the
basis of the prior public use, set aside the patent."" Under similar facts the
patent was upheld in the United States because the evidence of the
previous foreign use, in the absence of publications, was deemed
inadmissible.' 90 This is the "loophole" in the United States patent law that
makes "biopiracy" possible; arguments have been made that the legislature
should eliminate the geographical restriction for prior art."'
Strong arguments against the removal of the geographical restriction
192have also been made. These arguments center on the unavailability ofproducts from traditional knowledge; as one author has stated:
184. Information about the EPO, available at
http:/Iwww.european-patent-office.orglepo-general.htm#organ (last visited June 17, 2004)
(arguing that "the EPO is the outcome of the European countries' collective political
determination to establish a uniform patent system in Europe").
185. See SHIVA, supra 58, at 57-61.
186. Id. at 58.
187. Id.
188. Bagley, supra note 181, at 681-82.
189. Id. at 682.
190. Id. at 681.
191. See id.
192. See generally Craig Allen Nard, In Defense of Geographic Disparity: A Response to
Margo A. Bagley, Patently Unconstitutional: The Geographic Limitation on Prior Art in a
Small World, 88 MINN. L. REv. 222 (2003).
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[T]he driving force behind the clause was the enhancement of public
welfare. Section 102 of the patent code is consistent with utilitarianism
because the geographic distinction provides an incentive to invest in and
commercialize products derived from traditional knowledge--products
that otherwise would most likely remain undeveloped or out of reach
for a vast majority of potential beneficiaries."'
This author noted that pharmaceutical companies would be reluctant
to invest large sums of money in commercializing products for which they
could not recoup their investment due to a lack of patent rights, "thus
depriving all consumers., 194 The pharmaceutical companies do bring a
significant amount to the commercial development of products based on
native plants, which is not present in the "raw" knowledge of their use by
indigenous healers, such as testing and refining.' 95 Safety, efficacy, and
dosage testing are required for approval for use of any pharmaceuticals in
the United States.' 96 An example of this is found in the "accelerated"
approval of AZT, a drug marketed as Retrovir and used for the treatment
of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). 97 The FDA spent eight
years, at a cost of $600,000, evaluating AZT."' In that study, nineteen
patients died on placebos, while only one died taking AZT, proving the
efficacy of the drug. 9' While the costs from the FDA approval process
alone are large and likely beyond the reach of many developers in third
world countries, the total costs of research and commercialization for a
new drug are staggering, recently reaching $900,000,000 per drug.2°0 The
overall statistics for the development of new drugs illustrate the critical
nature of having as many new drugs as possible in the developmental
"pipeline":
Only one of 5,000 screened compounds is approved as a new medicine.
Of these 5,000 compounds, 250 enter preclinical testing, five proceed to
clinical testing and one is approved by the FDA. Only three of 10
193. Id. at 224-25.
194. Id. at 226.
195. Id. at 229.
196. DIXIE FARLEY, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BENEFIT VS. RISK: How FDA APPROVES NEW
DRUGS 1 (January 1995), available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/newdrug/berqefits.htmi




200. See Cutting Edge Information; Drug Development Costs Reach All-Time High,
BIOTECH WEEK 143 (Dec. 3, 2003).
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marketed drugs generate enough revenue to match or exceed research
and development (R&D) costs.2
z
Further support for the proposition that these products would be
unavailable if some exclusive rights are not given to those who bring them
to market is actually found in the arguments of one of the most strongly
committed supporters of the rights of indigenous peoples against
biopiracy, Vandana Shiva.' °2 In her discussion of the "discovery" of neem
by Robert Larson, she reports that Larson first observed the usefulness of
the tree in 1971 and began importing neem to the United States at that
time.' °3 She then mentions that "[o]ver the next decade, he conducted
safety and performance tests upon a pesticidal neem extract called
Margosan-O and in 1985 received clearance for the product from the US
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)."204 Considering the costs of
government approvals, and the decade he spent testing the product, it
would appear unlikely that he would have made this investment without
some expectation of exclusivity for the product. The constitutional
arguments made against retaining the geographic limitations also break
down when the unavailability of products to western consumers is
considered. 2" The author's arguments are strongly based on the free
2061
availability of information in the modern world. In the 1850 case of
Gayler v. Wilder, shortly after the legislature added the geographic
limitation to the determination of prior art, the Supreme Court discussed
the reason for this rule in dicta:
If the foreign invention had been printed or patented, it was already
given to the world and open to the people of this country, as well as of
others, upon reasonable inquiry. They would therefore derive no
advantage from the invention here. It would confer no benefit upon the
community, and the inventor therefore is not considered to be entitled
to the reward. But if the foreign discovery is not patented, nor described
in any printed publication, it might be known and used in remote places
for ages, and the people of this country be unable to profit by it. The
201. Alan F. Holmer, Have Pharmaceutical Companies Been Unfair to American
Consumers?, INSIGHT MAGAZINE 47 (Sept. 1, 2003) (quoting from a speech given by FDA
Commissioner Mark McClellan to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on June 9,
2004).
202. See SHIVA, supra note 58.
203. Id. at 58.
204. I4t
205. See generally Bagley, supra note 181.
206. Id. at 718.
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means of obtaining knowledge would not be within their reach; and, as
far as their interest is concerned, it would be the same thing as if the
improvement had never been discovered. It is the inventor here that
brings is [sic] to them, and places it in their possession. And as he does
this by the effort of his own genius, the law regards him as the first and
original inventor, and protects his patent, although the improvement
had in fact been invented before, and used by others."'
This argument is as relevant today as it was in 1850, although with a
slightly different slant. For example, much of the traditional knowledge is
not available for use in this country without approval from the relevant
government agencies, and the companies that expend the money to get
these approvals should be given the right to recoup their investment2
Perhaps the loss of availability of these drugs for the populations of
the developed countries is the price that has to be paid for political fairness
to the LDCs and DCs of the world. This would balance the rights of
companies in the developed countries to drugs developed at great expense
•• 209
in research labs against the rights of DCs to their traditional medicines.
While this is one possible outcome, it is an isolationist conclusion that
stands in opposition to the open world trade structure envisioned by the
210WTO and leads to losses for both groups. In the long term,
strengthening of patent rights around the world will most likely lead to the
balancing of rights, as will be discussed later in this comment. However,
this will take a significant period of time, and interim solutions seem to be
necessary. One possible interim approach that appears to be promising is
the contractual protection of traditional knowledge through
"bioprospecting agreements." '' There are two ways to implement these
types of arrangements: through amending the patent laws of developed
countries to require "lawful acquisition of genetic resources and an
207. 51 U.S. 477, 497 (1850).
208. See generally Nard, supra note 192.
209. See Bagley, supra note 181, at 688 ("[T]he policy ramifications of the § 102 limitation
are significant ... the United States fiercely condemns the pirating of U.S. intellectual
property by trading partners... [ylet, the § 102 geographical limitation facilitates the
'pirating' of unpatented, unpublished, traditional knowledge and genetic resources from
developing countries, exacerbating feelings of ill will.").
210. See UNDERSTANDING THE WTO, supra note 62, at 10.
211. See Nard, supra note 192, at 233.
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equitable compensatory arrangement, or to have voluntary agreements
213between western companies and organizations in developing nations.
C. Controversies on the Importance of Patent Rights
In examining the mechanisms for the development of more universal
patent rights, the utilitarian reasons for having patent rights in the first
214place, including their historical importance, should be examined . This
subject is discussed below, using patent rights in the United States as an
example, and the discussion focuses on three topics: the debate on the
value of patent rights, patent rights as a boost to creativity in the early
twentieth century, and modern concepts of patent rights.
Patent rights proponents, including inventors and assignees, hold as
accepted wisdom that technological innovation is critical to social progress
- a doctrine that is not necessarily held true by all societies or
organizations."' Even if technological innovation is believed to be socially
beneficial, does the issuance of a legal right to exclude others from
practicing an invention actually encourage the advancement of
technology?"' This question is the critical controversial point in
determining the importance of patent rights. Some authors have proposed
217the thesis that patent rights actually decrease innovation. The negative
response to patent rights by these authors is summarized by Vandana
Shiva:
IPRs are essentially a market distortion, a government sanctioned
monopoly and subsidy. IPRs put territorial borders around technologies
and other inventions so that firms can capture higher profits. In the long
212. Id.
213. Id. (pointing out that this later approach is exemplified by an agreement between the
Instituto Nacional de Bioveridad (INBio), a nonprofit organization in Costa Rica, and
Merck, a pharmaceutical company in the United States. In this agreement, INBio will
deliver 10,000 genetic specimens to Merck, along with information of their use by
indigenous peoples of the region, and Merck will pay $1.35 million up front and royalties on
products developed from the samples).
214. See DINWOODIE, supra note 5, § 2.02, at 49-53.
215. Id. at 49 ( "This thesis is not universally accepted, and is expressly rejected by some
groups that venerate traditional cultural values and beliefs and/or, perhaps less kindly,
others whose members are in a position to derive personal benefit from maintenance of the
status quo."); see generally The Foundation on Economic Trends, About FOET, available at
http://www.foet.org/AboutFET.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2004) (noting this organization,
founded by Jeremy Rifkin, a major anti-biotechnology activist, is focused on the harm that
unchecked new developments may have on society and the environment).
216. See id.
217. See SHIVA, supra note 58, at 4-5.
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term, a strong IPR system can result in price discriminations and many
market-distorting practices like patent pooling, tied-up sales, cross
licensing and refusal to licence [sic].218
In contrast to this view, corporations take the view that without patent
rights, investment in research would be pointless. A recent press release
from Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V., on the issuance of their
100,000th patent summarized this view:
Without patent[s] and the laws that protect them, Philips could not have
built up its impressive record as an innovation leader. Philips spends
billions of dollars a year on research and development. Through patent
and other Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), the company can
safeguard the fruits of its tremendous effort in R&D. 'If there were no
protection for our IPR, other companies could use our inventions at no
cost at all. That would all but kill the incentive to spend money on
R&D', says Ruud Peters, CEO of Intellectual Property & Standards
(IP&S) in Philips. 'Historically, countries that have protected their
inventors with a well-functioning system of patent law have fared better
than countries that have failed to do so.'
220
The press release goes on to make the point that the majority of
income from the development of intellectual property rights is reinvested
211in research and development activities. While a press release can usually
be considered an idealistic viewpoint, or the "face that the company wants
the world to see," the views on intellectual property expressed by Philips
are by no means unique.212 The right to exclude others from using a patent
provides companies with incentives to invent new technologies and to
223invest the funds required to bring these technologies to the marketplace.
A study done for the patent law institute in 1990 showed that even patent
rights in fields only indirectly related to core businesses, such as those in
electronics and computer related fields, could have value for the chemical,
218. Id. at 5.
219. Press Release, Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V., Philips Reaches Milestone of
100,000 Patents (2004) (on file with the author).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See generally POLTORAK & LERNER, supra note 9. "Whatever its other characteristics,
however, intellectual property does have economic value - often, great economic value -
although this value is often overlooked, underestimated, and underreported." Id. at xiii.
223. DINWOODIE, supra note 5, at 50.
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biotech, and pharmaceutical industries. 2 ' These types of patents support
the primary goals of the business, such as plant control systems, molecular
221
modeling, and neural networks. Companies with product patents in
these fields showed an average pretax return on investment of 19.7%,
while companies without showed an average of 13.8%. 126 The effects for
process patents and overall earnings were similar, with companies having
patent rights showing significant benefits over those companies without
such rights. 7
1. Historical Perspective on Patent Rights
In addition to short term benefits for companies and individuals, over
the long term strong patent rights can have extraordinarily beneficial
effects on all of society. This is illustrated by the stories of the inventor-
entrepreneurs of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as
Thomas Edison and Alfred Nobel. '2
The clearest example of the importance of patent rights, and its effects
on society, is shown by the life and career of Thomas Edison.22 Edison
had only three months of formal schooling and was only twenty-one years
230
old in 1870 when he invented a ticker tape machine for stockbrokers 3.
With the $40,000 he earned for the invention, he established a small lab in
Newark, and went on to invent the incandescent fight bulb in 1878.2 1 His
company, the Edison Electric Light Company, designed and built the first
power station in New York City in 1882.232 The developments he created
were made possible by the money earned from the patents, and they
created entire industries, including the electric power, motion picture, and
phonographic recording industries.233
Alfred Nobel made similar contributions to society. 2 4 Nobel was only
twenty-nine years old when the fundamental event that shaped his life
224. See generally Charles A. Weigel, Jr,, The Importance of Patent Protection of
Electronic and Computer Technology to the Chemical, Biotech, and Pharmaceutical
Industries, 292 PRACrISING L. INST. 459 (1990).
225. Id. at 470-72.
226. Id. at 467.
227. Id. at 468.






234. See DINWOODIE, supra note 5, at 50.
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took place: in 1864, his younger brother and four others were killed in an
explosion at his father's nitroglycerin factory in Stockholm, Sweden.3 5 He
promptly started working to find a safer alternative to the use of liquid
nitroglycerin, experimenting with mixtures of nitroglycerin and various
binders.23' He patented his invention in 1867, calling the mixture
"dynamite., 237  The patent earned a fortune, and Nobel continued to
innovate, earning 355 patents in his lifetime.238 Upon his death in 1896,
Nobel stipulated that the bulk of his estate be placed into a fund to give
annual prizes for the most significant advancements "in physics, chemistry,
physiology or medicine, and literature, and toward the promotion of
international peace.
2 39
2. The Purpose of Patent Rights
One author has stated that the greatest value of patent rights at this
time is as a source of shareholder confidence in a corporation's ability.240
The purpose of scientific discovery in this case is not the love of discovery,
but the sustenance of the corporation and the support of thousands or tens
of thousands of jobs.241  The contribution back to the community is
encouraged, but "is not at the center of what drives financial backers to
invest in a firm or what drives the firm to channel that investment into
R&D .... Where ownership rights are clear, investors are confident.,
242
While the theory above could perhaps be called the "investment
theory" of patent rights, other theories of the utilitarian purpose of patent
243
rights have focused on the reward and the prospect theories. In the
reward theory, patents are "granted to individuals who contribute to
economic and technological progress by inventing and disclosing the
inventions.",244 While this would seem like a plausible theory, most patents
241
are never exploited, thus their value cannot be considered relevant.





239. Nobel, Alfred Bernard, HISTORYCHANNEL.COM, available at
http://www.historychannel.com/perl/print-book.pl?ID=103970 (last visited Sept. 14, 2004).
240. See DINWOODIE, supra note 5, at 50-51.
241. Id. at 51.
242. Id.
243. See DE CARVALHO, supra note 59, at 2.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 2-3.
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consideration of the scientific field, or how important the technical subject
matter is that they cover. 246 Finally, the patent laws of many countries
clearly state that the purpose of patents is to accomplish social goal. and
• i" -. . 247
not to reward individuals.
V. ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES IN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES
Although the value of patent rights is hotly debated, especially by
residents of the LDCs and DCs, protection of these rights is a requirement
for membership in the WTO.14' To implement these protections, nations
must change their laws to be in compliance with the minimum
requirements expressed in TRIPS.14 The TRIPS Agreement requires that
Member States notify the WTO when their laws or regulations are
250
changed to effect the obligations °. In this section, the changes made in
order made to comply with the TRIPS Agreement in the United States,
India, and China will be discussed. The international pressures required to
change their national patent laws to conform to the TRIPS Agreement will
be examined. In addition, some examples of the treatment of foreign
nationals in the national courts of these countries will be analyzed, since
appropriate legislation does not guarantee fair or equal treatment.
The United States and China were both signatories to the original
2511GATT treaty, which took effect on January 1, 1948. Since then, the
United States has continuously been a member of GATT; China left the
organization after the communist revolution in 1949, at which time it broke
all outside business ties."' Both India and the United States became
members of the WTO when the treaty went into effect on January 1,
246. Id. at 3.
247. Id.
248. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67.
249. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the TRIPS Agreement requirements).
250. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, at 346.
251. See id. at 1.
252. Charlene Barshefsky, China's WTO Accession in American Postwar Strategy,
Address Before the Bretton Woods Committee (May 16, 2000), available at




1995.253 However, China did not re-accede to membership in the WTO
until December 11, 2001.54
A. Changes in Patent Law as a Result of the WTO
The requirement to change patent laws to harmonize them with the
GATT treaty was not confined to LDCs and DCs; the United States also
required changes in order to comply.255 Four major changes were required
in the domestic patent laws of the United States to conform to TRIPS: the
patent term was changed from seventeen years from date of issue to
twenty years from date of filing, inventive activities in any WTO country
can now be used to establish priority, the scope of infringement was
broadened and now includes "offers for sale" and importation of infringing
256goods. In comparison to changes required in many other countries,
those in the United States may seem minor, but they triggered significant
controversy, especially the change in patent term."' The primary purpose
of this change was to prevent what are termed "submarine" patents. 21' A
submarine patent is one that has been filed (or the continuation of a
previously filed patent) but not issued, which resurfaces at a later date with
a seventeen year term, perhaps just as a technological field has
developed.259
The patent term change was part of the Uruguay Round Agreements
Act, which implemented the general requirements for WTO membership
260in United States law. Under the new system, a patent that takes a
significant period of time to issue, for any reason whatsoever, will lose
patent protection at an earlier date than under the previous term.16' Laterlegislation mitigated this rather harsh result by allowing time to be added
253. WTO, Understanding the WTO: The Organization, Members and Observers, available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatise/tif-e/org6_e.htm (last visited Sept. 14,
2004).
254. Id.
255. See generally Sorell et al., supra note 61.
256. Id. at 97-98.
257. Id. at 98.
258. Id. at 101.
259. Id. at 119 n.3.
260. Adam Isaac Hasson, Domestic Implementation of International Obligations: The Quest
for World Patent Harmonization, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 373, 380 (2002); see also
19 U.S.C. 3511 (1994).
261. Sorrell et al., supra note 61, at 105-06.
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to the patent term for delays out of the control of the inventor, including
262delays in processing, appeals, and interferences, among others.
In contrast to the United States, both India and China made
significant changes to their patent laws in order to bring them into
263
compliance. Indian patent laws, prior to the enactment of the WTO in
1995, provided no coverage for plants, pharmaceuticals, agricultural
chemicals, or products made by chemical processes.264 This dates back to
the Patent Act of 1970, in which the president of a large Indian
pharmaceutical manufacturer lobbied then Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi,1 .. . 265
to block product patents for pharmaceuticals. The purpose of this was
not to supply the Indian population with large amounts of lower cost
copies of drugs patented in the developed countries, but to enable the
Indian pharmaceutical firms to produce these copies for export to other
world markets in which there was little or no patent protection on the
26drugs. A clear example is found in the copies of HIV/AIDS drugs made
by the major Indian pharmaceutical manufacturer, CIPLA. CIPLA makes
these drugs and exports them at a very low price of $350/year/patient, and
is still able to make a profit at these very low rates because the company
completely lacks research and development costs. 267 While these drugs
were being exported at that cost in early 2001, the treatments were not
available in India below a cost of $1,320/year/patient until later that year.268
Even at the lower cost, very few of India's AIDS patients were receiving
the therapy because the government would not pick up the cost of the
262. See generally William Slate, The Sky is Not Falling. The Effects of Term Adjustment
Under the American Inventor's Protection Act on Patent Prosecution, 4 -YALE SYMP. ON L. &
TECH. 7 (2001).
263. See generally Susan Finston, India: A Cautionary Tale on the Critical Importance of
Intellectual Property Protection, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 887 (2002);
see also George K. Foster, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent
Protection: The U.S. and India in the Uruguay Round and Its Aftermath, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L.
& FOREIGN AFF. 283 (1998); Kenneth Parks, et al., India Modifies Patent Laws, 7 No. 3 J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 33 (1995); WTO Requests Amendment to India Patent Laws, 10 No. 3 J.
PROPRIETARY RTS. 23 (1998); David Hill & Judith Evans, Chinese Patent Law: Recent
Changes Align China More Closely with Modern International Practice, 27 GEO. WASH. J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 359 (1994); Jiwen Chen, Better Patent Law for International Commitment
- The Amendment of Chinese Patent Law, 2 RICH. J. OF GLOBAL L. & Bus. 61 (2001).
264. Parks et al., supra note 263, at 33.
265. Finston, supra note 263, at 888-89.
266. Id. at 892.




219drugs. In 1995, the implementation of the Uruguay Round of the
GATT, which created the WTO, inherently forced a change of Indian
patent laws.2 The changes required were to introduce protection for
agricultural chemicals and pharmaceuticals, but India was able to delay
their implementation on the basis of the WTO rules for implementation of
the TRIPS standards by developing nations."' This gave India until
272December 31, 2004 to actually implement the recommendations. In the
intervening years, however, India would be required to set up a "mailbox,"
for patent applications to be sent for registration after which they are given
a priority date, and, upon request, exclusive marketing rights for the last
273five years prior to the 2004 deadline.
B. The Dispute Resolution Process at the WTO
India did not complete these requirements, and a request for
consultation was brought in the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body by the
United States in 1996, demanding that India make the needed changes to
its patent laws: "India's legal regime appears to be inconsistent with India's
obligations under the TRIPS Agreement, including but not necessarily
limited to Article[s] 27, 65, and 70 of the Agreement., 274
The path of the dispute will be discussed in some detail here as it
provides an excellent example of the dispute resolution process available
through the WTO, including: the time required for the resolution, the
responses of the parties, and the actions taken at the national levels in
response to the outcome of the dispute. The importance of the
negotiations to merchants in other parts of the world was confirmed by a
request from the European Union to join in the consultations with India:
"[t]he European pharmaceutical and agro-chemical industry has important
export interests in the Indian market. The actual amount of these interests
is, at this stage, difficult to evaluate because the Republic of India does not
provide for either patent protection or the above-mentioned filing and
marketing systems.""27  India responded to the request, and formally
269. Id. at n.27, p. 893.
270. Parks, supra note 263.
271. Id.
272. Id.; see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, at 348.
273. Foster, supra note 263, at 295; see also TRIPS Agreement, supra note 67, at 348.
274. WTO, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Products: Request
for Consultations by the United States, WT/DS50/1 (July 9, 1996).
275. WTO, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products: Request to Join Consultations, Communication from the European Communities,
WT/DS50/2 (July 22,1996).
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276permitted the European Union to participate in the discussions. India,
the United States, and the European Union met on July 29, 1996, but were
unable to come to any sort of an agreement, leading the United States to
formally request that a panel from the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of
the WTO be designated to look into the issue.277 This panel was formally
established by the DSB, and notifications were sent to the United States
and India, with the European Union reserving the right to participate as a
2781third party.
1. The Findings of the WTO Panel
On the issue of Article 70.8 of the TRIPS Agreement, India argued
that it had set up a de-facto mailbox system for the registration of patents;
however, there was no evidence to show that they had informed the TRIPS
Council, or any other international body of this fact. 279 The United States
argued that as international agreements require legislation to be binding in
India, a lapse in legislation prevented the establishment of a legally
defensible mailbox system in India; thus, the result would be automatic
rejection of pharmaceutical and chemical patents. India made the
argument that the entire point of the transitional period was to allow
LDCs the time needed to build consensus for unpopular changes to the
patent laws without requiring immediate changes, and that by forcing the
unpopular actions, the United States was circumventing the purpose of the
delay,21 thus eliminating any advantage that the extra time gave the
government in selling an unpopular change to its people.2
On the additional issue of Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement,
which would require a developing country to grant an exclusive marketing
right for a new product during the final five years of the transition period
276. WTO, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Products:
Acceptance by India of the Request to Join Consultations by the European Communities
under Article 4.11 of the DSU, WT/DS50/3 (July 29, 1996).
277. WTO, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products: Request for the Establishment of a Panel, WT/DS50/4 (Nov. 8, 1996).
278. WTO, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products: Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the United States,
WTIDS5015 (Feb. 5, 1997).
279. WTO, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products: Report of the Panel, WT[DS50/R, at pt. II.F (Sept. 5, 1997) [hereinafter
WRJDS50/Rl.
280. Id. at pt. IV.2.3.




prior to patentability, India stated that no particular product was found to
have had full marketing approval in the United States prior to the
dispute.283 Since this is a necessary condition for the granting of the
exclusive rights by the non-patenting nation, it was their contention that
this excused the development of a mechanism.
The European Union, having been permitted by India to participate
in the proceedings, was allowed to submit testimony to the Panel."' They
expressed surprise at India's claim that they had fulfilled their obligations
under Article 70.8 by setting up the mailbox system, since no mechanism
286had been published. The Panel also disagreed with India's contention
that since no patent filings were made under the system, India was justified
in postponing the development of any mechanism for granting exclusive
marketing rights under 70.9. 2" They specifically asked what the
administrative instructions were for the system, where they were
published, and what guarantees were in place to resolve disputes in Indian
Courts.28' The European Union's testimony made their opinion of the
current mechanisms clear: "[i]n answering these questions, India would
have to admit that simple administrative instructions did not fulfil[l] the
requirements laid down in Articles 70.8 and 70.9.289
The Panel's findings also focused on Articles 70.8, and 70.9, although
some procedural issues were included by necessity.2' °  The Panel
reaffirmed the view that if a developing country were to take advantage of
the transitional period in Article 66 of the TRIPS Agreement, the country
was required to set up a mailbox system, wherein the patent could be sent,
and the inventor could obtain priority as of the date the application was
received.29' The panel found that any mechanism for registering filing
dates must have a legally sound basis, or be inoperable, which would risk
283. Id. at Part IV.2.27.
284. Id.
285. WT/DS50/R, supra note 279, pt. V.3.1.




290. Id. at pt. VII.5.8-5.22 (noting that the United States claimed that if India had
established a mailbox system, their failure to publish it was a violation of Article 63 of the
TRIPS Agreement, requiring member states to clearly publish their procedures, laws, and
regulations, and to inform the TRIPS Council; the panel agreed with the United States on
this point).
291. WT/DS50/R, supra note 279, Part VII.5.27.
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losing novelty for the patents filed.2 2 Therefore, any country that wished
to take advantage of the transitional period was required to have an
established legal mechanism for the granting of patent rights at the end of
the transition period in place by the operational date of the WTO
agreement, i.e. January 1, 1995.293 One of the points most strongly
emphasized by the panel is that the legal insecurity of having an informal
system could place restraints on the actions of parties, since under Indian
patent law, any pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical is automatically
294
rejected. The panel also agreed with the contention that India had
violated the transparency requirements in Article 63 by not publishing
details of its mailbox system, and not informing the Council for TRIPS of
the legal basis for handling such applications after the expiration of the
Patents (Amendment) Ordinance of 1994."' As for the obligation to set
up a mechanism to grant exclusive marketing rights for five years prior to
the patent under Article 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement, the panel found
that India was obliged to have the mechanism in place by January 1, 1995
when the WTO agreement went into effect. 6 In conclusion, the panel
recommended that the DSB request that India bring its patent laws into
compliance with the TRIPS Agreement with respect to transitional rights
297for pharmaceutical and agricultural patents.
2. The Appeal of the Ruling to the Appellate Body
As would be expected in any very contentious legal proceeding, India
promptly appealed the ruling.28 Three members of a permanent seven-
member panel called the Appellate Body (AB) hear appeals from rulings
in the DSB.299 The Appellate Body can "uphold, modify or reverse the
Panel's legal findings and conclusions."3°° Once they have made their
decision, the DSB can accept or reject the report, but rejection is only
possible by consensus. °1 The AB reviewed the evidence presented in the
initial Panel proceeding, and upheld the Panel's findings that India was not
292. Id. at pt. VII.5.28.
293. Id. at pt. VII.5.31.
294. Id. at pt. VII.5.35-5.36.
295. Id. at pt. VII.5.46-5.50.
296. Id. at pt. VII.5.63.
297. WT/DS50/R, supra note 279, pt. VIII.6.2.
298. WTO, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products, WT/DS50/AB/R (Dec. 19, 1997) [hereinafter WT/DS50/AB/RJ.





302in compliance with Articles 70.8 and 70.9 of the TRIPS Agreement.
However, the AB overturned the finding that India was in violation of the
transparency requirements of Article 63 because that issue had not been
raised in the initial complaint.0 3
3. Changes in Indian Patent. Law as a Result of the Resolution
The final decision of the AB was issued on December 19, 1997 and
adopted by the full DSB on January 16, 1998. After the decision was
adopted, India and the United States met and decided that fifteen months
from the time of their April 21, 1998 meeting, was a reasonable period of
time to pass the legislation needed for implementation of the TRIPS
Agreement obligations.305 This initial report was followed up by a series of
status reports and communications from India and between the various
306parties, discussing the efforts to pass the legislation required, leading to
the final report of passage of a permanent bill on the issue on March 26,
1999.307 The initial letter requesting consultation was issued in July of
1996, as discussed above, so the entire procedure and final passage of the
bill in the Indian Parliament took around three years.
302. WT/DS50/AB/R, supra note 298, at pt. IX.97.
303. Id. (noting that the issue for which a violation of Article 63 was raised was not in
existence at the time the complaining letter was sent out; thus, even though the issue was
not known at the time, it was not allowed to be brought up later, even as a response).
304. WTO, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products: Status Report by India, WT/DS50/10 (Nov. 12, 1998) [hereinafter WT/DS50/10].
305. Id.
306. See WTO, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products: Status Report by India, WT/DS50/10/Add.1 (Jan. 14, 1999); see also WTO, India -
Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, Recourse to
Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS50/ll (Jan. 20, 1999) (expressing that the United States
doubts that the temporary ordinance proposed will meet India's obligations under TRIPS);
WTO, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products,
Request by the European Communities and its Member States Regarding Consultations by
the United States WT/DS50/12 (Feb. 4, 1999) (requesting that the European Union wished
to join in any consultations regarding this issue); WTO, India - Patent Protection for
Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products: Status Report by India,
WT/DS50/10/Add.2 (Feb. 5, 1999) (noting that a bill to replace the temporary ordinance
the United States and Europe are objecting to will be introduced in the next session of
Parliament); WTO, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products: Status Report by India, WT/DS50/10/Add.3 (March 9, 1999) (noting passage of
ordinance and introduction of bill into the next session of Parliament).
307. WTO, India - Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical
Products: Status Report by India, WT/DS50/10/Add.4 (April 16,1999).
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4. Recent Changes in Chinese Patent Law
The development of modern concepts of patent rights in China did
not essentially start until the open door policy was implemented in the late
1970s, after the death of Chairman Mao. In 1979, a drafting group was
established to study other patent law systems and make recommendations
on the establishment of a new patent law system in China.3 9 The People's
Congress adopted a new patent law on March 6, 1984.
Outside efforts to ensure adequate intellectual property protection in
China have taken a significantly different approach from those for India, in
that they started earlier and took place much more unilaterally."'
Negotiations from the trade dispute resulted in the implementation of a
"memo of understanding" between China and the United States in 1992.
Pressure was not applied by a multilateral international organization, such
as the WTO, but directly by the United States threatening the use of the
"Special 301" rule in U.S. trade laws.31 3  As a result of the memo of
understanding, China agreed to modify its patent laws by January 1, 1993,
"to make product patents available for all chemical inventions, including
pharmaceuticals and agricultural chemicals, provide a term of protection
of 20 years for the date of filing of a patent application, and impose
conditions on the grant of compulsory licenses. 3 14 While these changes
were significant in the amount of protection they afforded inventors, they
did not necessarily take patent protection in China to the level expected in
other nations."' However, in 2000, China implemented a much stronger
316
revision to prepare for membership in the WTO. This revision took
308. See Robert G. Oake, Jr., A Primer on Chinese Patent Law (on file with the author).
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See generally Qaio Dexi, A Survey of Intellectual Property Issues in China-U.S. Trade
Negotiations Under the Special 301 Provisions, 2 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 259 (1993); see also
John Gero & Kathleen Lannan, Trade and Innovation: Unilateralism v. Multilateralism, 21
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 81 (1995); Myles Getlan, Comment, TRIPS and the Future of Section 301: A
Comparative Study in Trade Dispute Resolution, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 173 (1995).
312. Dexi, supra note 311, at 259.
313. See Getlan, supra note 311, at 178-179 (providing an excellent overview of the "Special
301" provisions of the United States Omnibus and Competitiveness Act of 1988; the article
in general compares the Special 301 provisions with the enforcement provisions of the
TRIPS Agreement, concluding that TRIPS will be a far more effective tool).
314. Memorandum of Understanding on the Protection of Intellectual Property, Jan. 17,
1992, U.S.-P.R.C., Explanation of the Agreement, DEP'T ST. BULL, Jan. 17, 1992.
315. See Louis S. Sorrell, A Comparative Analysis of Selected Aspects of Patent Law in




effect on July 1, 2001, and included changes such as harmonizing Chinese
patent law with the TRIPS Agreement, streamlining the approval process,
and strengthening patent rights.317 China has implemented a first to file
system, like much of the world outside of the United States, but using
novelty, non-obviousness, and utility requirements that are roughly
analogous to the United States' standards."' The most significant
differences are in subject matter and infringement proceedings. Unlike the
United States, patentable subject matter in China excludes plants and
"methods for the diagnosis or for the treatment of diseases." 319 In China,
infringement proceedings can take two distinct paths, either going into the
courts or through an administrative proceeding that has no analogous
320
counterpart in the United States. In addition to these differences,
Chinese law is inquisitorial, i.e. based on administrative principles rather
than common law principles, making the lack of experience of the judges
more difficult to overcome because no case has precedential value.321
Despite all of these problems, China seems sincere in its attempts to
implement strong intellectual property rights, and motivated to move
forward: "China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO)
brings a sense of urgency for [the] Chinese to improve their understanding
about intellectual property rights and patents." '322
VI. THE USE OF LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR PATENTS AT THE NATIONAL
LEVEL
While the development of mechanisms for the protection of patent
rights is important, all of the actual proceedings to stop misappropriation
must still take place at the private litigation level.12 In this section, a few
private enforcement actions that have taken place in the United States,
China, and India are examined to determine what differences are seen. It
should be noted that this is not a statistical sampling to determine if the
different nations' courts treat foreign nationals with less fairness.
317. See id.
318. Id. at 326.
319. Id. at 327.
320. Id. at 328-29.
321. See Sorrell, supra note 315, at 331.
322. Patent Law to Take on New Significance, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Nov. 14, 2001 (quoting
Tian Lipu, Deputy Director of State Intellectual Property Office).
323. DE CARVALHO, supra note 59, at 33 ("[T]he role of governments is to pass legislation
and create the institutions that enable private citizens to protect themselves against
infringement, rather than enforcing private rights on behalf of citizens.").
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A. United States
The following cases are from U.S. courts and were pharmaceutical
patent infringement cases between American companies and Indian
companies. In the first, Pharmacia & Upjohn Company v. Ranbaxy
324Pharmaceuticals, an Indian company attempted to make a small change
within a claimed formulation and start importing a look alike drug into the
United States.32 Since the change was within the claims of the patent, the
court granted a preliminary injunction against Ranbaxy.126 Ranbaxy then
attempted to invalidate the patent on a double patenting argument over a
previous Pharmacia application. Even with a rather obscure and complex
argument, the judge was able to discern the issues and find in favor of the
patent.327
In the second patent infringement case, Dr. Reddy's Laboratories,
Ltd. v Aaipharma Inc.,"8 an American company attempted to use patent
rights obtained on structural information of a pharmaceutical, which it had
discovered after a previous patent term had expired, to block a generic
manufacturer in India from entering the United States market. In
addition to using the patent rights against the company, the American
company obtained a sample of the product the Indian company would be
shipping. The American company turned it over to the initial patent
holder for testing, upon which the initial patent holder made a claim to the
FDA that the product was not functionally equivalent, a requirement for
permission to manufacture a generic drug.13 The Indian firm brought suit,
alleging damages from the extra testing required, and the American firm
attempted to claim immunity from suit for turning data over to a
government agency. "' The judge saw through all of these attempts and
332denied the American firm's attempt to have the case dismissed.
324. 85 FED. Appx. 205, available at 2003 WL 23016042 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (unpublished
opinion).
325. Id. at 207-08.
326. Id. at 209.
327. Id. at 214.
328. 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 1878, available at 2002 WL 31059289 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (not reported in
F. Supp. 2d).
329. Id. at 3.
330. Id. at 11.
331. Id. at 12.




Since India will not allow the patenting of pharmaceuticals or
chemicals until January 1, 2005, only cases on infringement of analogous
intellectual property rights could be examined. In the first, Schneider
Electric Industries, S.A. v. Telemacanique & Controls, Ltd.," an Indian
firm sought to invalidate a design patent as actually being a utility type
patent, so the local firm could continue making copies of the foreign
company's design, outside of a previous licensing agreement.' 34 The Indian
court issued an injunction against the Indian firm to prevent it from
continuing to copy the foreign firm's design."5  In a trademark case,•336
Rainforest Caft v. Chidabram, the defendant who was operating a
restaurant based on the unlicensed (and poor quality) use of the plaintiff's
theme claimed that since the plaintiff had no restaurants in India at that
time, there was no goodwill built up for the defendant to destroy."' The
court found that the worldwide reputation of the restaurant chain was
sufficient, and that the obvious imitation of the logo had just enough
338
changes so as to appear to be deliberately designed to create a defense.An injunction was issued to bar further operation of the imitator. 9
C. China
In a Chinese case, Shengzen Triangle Science & Technology Industrial
Company, Ltd. v. Compaq Computer Corp.,340 a Chinese company
attempted to enforce an unused patent on a design for a laptop computer
against Compaq for its sales of the Armada series of laptops in China. 341 In
their decision, the judges found that not all of the elements required by the
333. M/s Schneider Electric Industries S.A. v. Telemecanique & Controls (India) Ltd.,
Delhi High Court, Suit No. 1919/1999 (Nov. 27, 2000).
334. Id.
335. Id. ("I am satisfied that the plaintiff has made out a case for grant of interim injunction
and accordingly IA.8522/99 is allowed and that till the disposal of the suit, the defendants,
their agents, servants and assignees are restrained from manufacturing and advertising...
products of the plaintiff").
336. Rainforest Caf6, Inc. v. Rainforest Caf6 & Ors., Delhi High Court, Suit No. 72/2000
(April 12, 2001).
337. Id.
338. Id. (issuing an injunction against further operation of the imitator).
339. Id.
340. Shengzen Triangle Science & Technology Industrial Company, Ltd. v. Compaq
Computer Corp. of the United States, Chinalaw Database of Chinese Judicial Cases, Dec.
8, 2000 (The Higher People's Court of Beijing Municipality).
341. Id.
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claims were present in Compaq's computer, and ruled for the
defendants.342
In all three countries it should be noted that the judges, at least in
these cases, appear to have based their decisions on sound principles using
the intellectual property law in their jurisdictions as the appropriate tool to
reach their final decision. This tends to indicate that the most important
consideration is to provide the judges with the clearest set of tools possible
so that the decisions are consistent, and strongly support intellectual
property rights.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE NEED FOR STRONG LAWS TO PROTECT
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
This comment focuses on the tools available to acquire and enforce
patent rights in markets around the world. These tools are the treaties that
have created the major intellectual property organizations, including
WIPO, 343 and the TRIPS Agreement within the WTO.'44 The lack of
power within the WIPO to force the normalization of national Intellectual
Property laws directly led the developed countries to negotiate the TRIPS
Agreement, placing enforcement of changes to national laws to protect
IPRs into a structure that tied these changes to overall trade
considerations. 34'5 The obligation to normalize intellectual property laws
146then became an obligation of membership in the WTO.
This obligatory normalization has been perceived as an attempt by the
developed nations to force their own views on the LDCs and DCs of the
world. 47  The greatest concerns of the LDCs and DCs are the loss of
industries dedicated to imitating goods patented in developed countries, 48
342. Id.
343. See supra Part III.A (discussing WIPO).
344. See supra Part III.B (discussing the TRIPS Agreement).
345. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the reason for including the TRIPS Agreement in
the WTO).
346. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing the obligation of Member States).
347. See supra Part III.A.1; see also supra Part III.B.2 - IV (discussing the difficulties that
LDCs and DCs have in implementing their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement).
348. See supra at Part IV (discussing the effects that stronger IPRs would have on
industries, using the example of the disappearance of the Chilean pharmaceutical industry
when stronger IPRs were adopted).
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the potential lack of available medicines for their population, 34' and the• • 350
perceived theft of indigenous knowledge.
The developed countries have also identified the protection of IPRs as
fundamental to their survival in a time when more and more production is
being shifted to countries with lower labor costs.35" ' While the balance of
power seems to be wholly on the side of the developed nations, the losses
. 3 5 2
from the theft of intellectual property are staggering, and also includesS . 353
dangers from poorly made imitations. Even the patenting of indigenous
knowledge is not as unfair as it would seem. Without some measure of
exclusivity to reward the development of products based on this
knowledge, it would not be available to the developed countries, due to
314the detailed and expensive approval processes.
The implementation of the TRIPS Agreement within the WTO
structure has led to significant changes in the patent laws of LDCs and
DCs to protect and enforce the ownership of IPRs.355 However, there has
been great reluctance in India to implement the provisions, since, as in
Chile, the likely initial outcome is the demise of a thriving pharmaceutical
industry dedicated to imitating products patented by the drug companies
of the developed countries.356 The lack of progress in implementation of
the TRIPS Agreement in India led the United States to bring an action in
the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO. 357 This action illustrated the
power of the WTO dispute resolution process: within three years of the
initial filing of the action, the laws of India changed to implement the
necessary provisions. In China, the actions taken to force improvements
in the protection of IPRs were taken much earlier, and were unilateral on
the part of the United States. 9  However, China also made further
349. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the Doha agreement, which was implemented in an
attempt to relieve some of the immediate pressure on the LDCs and DCs).
350. See supra Part IV.B (discussing biopiracy).
351. See supra Part I (discussing off-shoring of jobs).
352. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the amounts lost from the theft of intellectual
property).
353. See supra Part IV.A (pointing out that counterfeit pharmaceuticals have caused health
problems).
354. See supra Part IV.B (discussing costs of pharmaceutical development).
355. See supra Part V.A (detailing the timeframe of changes to the laws of the United
States, India, and China).
356. See supra Part V.A (discussing the Indian Pharmaceutical industry).
357. See supra Part V.B.1 (discussing the dispute resolution process of the WTO).
358. See supra Part V.B.2.
359. See supra Part V.B.3 (discussing the changes in Chinese patent law).
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changes to improve its patent laws in preparation for joining the WTO in
2001.360
In all three nations, a brief examination of cases showed that the
courts enforced the patent laws as written, and that, when given the tools,
the judges did not hesitate to use them to prevent infringement. 6'
Strong intellectual property protection not only benefits the
developed countries, but also the LDCs and DCs.3 62 As one author has
noted, one only has to look at the difference in progress between the
information technology and pharmaceutical industries in India to see the
importance of IPRs.363 In the information technology industry, where IPRs
were not opposed by an entrenched constituency, over 250,000 persons are
employed, and the sector is actually taking business from Western firms.'
64
In the pharmaceutical sector, where patent rights are nonexistent, no new
drugs are being developed, and India is losing many of its most talented
scientists to the West. 6  This is a tragedy in a country that could use that
talent to develop new drugs for endemic diseases, 6 and one that could be
mitigated by stronger protection of patent rights.
The historical lessons of Edison and Nobel show that the protection of
patent rights can give young scientists and engineers the motivation and
funding to develop new products leading to entirely new industries and
changing the face of nations and the world.367
360. See supra Part V.B.4.
361. See supra Part VI (discussing cases brought before the courts of the individual
nations).
362. See Finston, supra note 263, at 887.
363. Id. at 888.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 890.
366. Id. at 891-92.
367. See supra Part JV.B.1 (discussing Edison and Nobel).
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